Abstract The good governance of institutions and regimes requires accountability suited to the particular context of each institution and regime. The paper examines the nature of accountability in climate change governance using the Caribbean region as a case study. In doing so, the paper makes two original contributions. First, using insights from the environmental governance literature, it presents a conceptual framework that categorises the types (levels, relationships and mechanisms) of accountability in governance that can be used to test accountability. The accountability framework comprises two levels (internal/ external accountability); four relationships (normative, relational, decision and behavioural); and four mechanisms or processes through which accountability can be exercised (certification, monitoring, participation by stakeholders in the overseeing of projects and self-reporting). Second, through an analysis of survey and interview responses from Caribbean climate change experts, it reports on the nature of accountability in climate change governance in the context of Caribbean Small Island Developing States. To do this, first it identifies the actors involved in Caribbean climate governance at the regional and national scales. Then, using the framework, it examines which levels, relationships and processes exist within and between climate governance regional institutions, international partners, government agencies, non-governmental organisations and the private sector for climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts. The paper draws two main conclusions: first, generally actors valued accountability as a good governance norm. Secondly, limited resources and the perception that using the accountability mechanisms will retard policy implementation led to low levels of accountability in practice. Finally, the study examined how accountability can be enhanced in the climate change sector by ensuring that each of the elements of the framework is operationalised for both state and non-state climate change projects.
Introduction
Accountability is part of good governance for actors and institutions, and governance quality affects institutional effectiveness (Biermann et al. 2010; Balsiger and Van Deveer 2012) . Embedded in the climate change challenge is systems governance, part of which is accountability between stakeholders (Walker et al. 2009 ). Improving accountability leads to better governance outcomes and improved stakeholders' perceptions of effectiveness (Biermann et al. 2010; Dellas 2011; Keohane and Victor 2011; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011; Biermann 2012) . But the practice of governance is always located in and shaped by political, economic, environmental and country specific contexts (Okereke 2010; Underdal 2010) . Delving into the particularities of each context and region can help us better understand which governance processes are most effective (Burton et al. 2002; Okereke 2010 ) and helpful in decision-making (Cash and Moser 2000) . This paper contributes to the growing literature on what good climate change governance looks like in the context of developing states.
Developing countries have specific vulnerabilities and resource scarcities which make governance challenging for top-down approaches (Adger 2006; Barnett 2010) , for transboundary resource management-as in the case of fisheries, for example, in the Caribbean [resource and limitations of scale in SIDS marine governance (Chakalall et al. 2007 )]-and also for local and household level efforts to adapt to climate vulnerability [as a recent case study in Costa Rica confirmed (Warner et al. 2015) ]. Studies on SIDS environmental governance, though not climate change specifically, point to the value of engaging stakeholders for improved governance outcomes, as for example the study on geographic information systems for marine resource management in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada (Baldwin et al. 2013) . A recent climate governance study analysed Caribbean Islands' climate change governance from the perspective of policy integration in local contexts, looking at the indicators that can best help evaluate policy coherence and the contextual obstacles in these islands such as silos in governance architectures, reluctance to share data and insufficient willingness on the part of ruling political parties to resource policy coherence activities (Scobie 2016) . That study mentioned a lack of accountability among actors as one of the challenges with policy coherence. Following from Lockwood who developed a framework of principles and performance outcomes for good governance for terrestrial protected areas (not specifically developing states) (Lockwood 2010) , another study found that in coral reef-dependent communities in the Wider Caribbean, perceptions of institutional engagement and acceptance depended on the structure of natural resource governance and that it was important to build structures and processes in governance systems that can be positively perceived by local stakeholders if support for and compliance with the regulations are to be achieved (Turner et al. 2014) . This paper develops from the arguments by Scobie and Lockwood to examine in greater detail what climate change accountability mandates and activities mean for of the main regional actors. It makes two original contributions to the literature. First it answers the question: what does accountability mean for climate change governance? Using the environmental governance literature, I create a framework to explain accountability: accountability has different levels (internal and external to the organisation or network of organisations); accountability creates several types of relationships among stakeholders, and finally accountability requires the existence of several mechanisms through which accountability can be exercised. The accountability framework distinguishes between accountability levels (internal/external) (Keohane 2003) ; accountability relationships (normative, relational, decision and behavioural) (Biermann and Gupta 2011) ; and accountability mechanisms (certification, stakeholder participation, performance monitoring and self-reporting).
The second original contribution of this paper is the in-depth analysis of the state of accountability in climate change governance in the Commonwealth Caribbean Island States. The main actors in climate change governance in the region are regional organisations, national government departments and agencies, environmental NGOs and the private sector. Using the accountability framework as the analytical tool, the study was able to report on a survey conducted and follow-up interviews held with main actors in climate change governance. The scope of this study is not an analysis of governance and accountability outcomes or effectiveness but rather the study provides a framework to understand the nature, existence and use of accountability structures and mechanisms and applies this framework to Caribbean SIDS climate governance.
The Caribbean and climate change governance
Small island developing states (SIDS) include 37 developing states, 52 countries and territories and over 50 million people from the Caribbean, Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea regions. SIDS in 1991 formed the Alliance of Small Island Developing states (AOSIS): an ad hoc negotiating and lobbying body of SIDS within the UN to advocate for their environmental concerns especially related to climate change. Caribbean SIDS-they include former and present Spanish, English, French and Dutch dependencies-have been active through AOSIS on climate change issues. SIDS represent a unique group of states in the context of sustainable development and climate governance because of the multiple challenges to their precarious economic and environmental survival exacerbated by gradual and extreme climatic events. They share in common: small land masses, substantial concentration of infrastructure and communities in coastal regions that are vulnerable to storm surges and sea level rise, limited financial, technical and human resources, undiversified economies, vulnerability and openness to external economic shocks, and limited resilience to frequent extreme climatic events (hurricanes, storm surges, drought). Their small and open economies crumble with a contraction of the global economy or with a fall in local production after a natural disaster (Sanders 1997) . Many islands have substantial debt burdens which limit fiscal and policy space (Alleyne et al. 2014) . Public debt in the Caribbean region, for example, was in excess of 76% of GDP and reached 103% of government revenue in Jamaica in 2009. Climate change is an added challenge to already weak economies. The region depends heavily upon tourism, a sector itself greatly reliant on the environment that amounts to 38% of total exports on average and to as much as 70% in some islands. The tourism industry may lose up to US$146 million of revenue because of the higher adaptation costs (Moore et al. 2010; Vergara et al. 2013) , and approximately 49-60% of tourist resort properties are at risk from rising sea levels (Scott et al. 2012; Field et al. 2014) . Massive coral bleaching is already a regional problem, and in several places mangroves are being depleted by rising sea levels (Bermuda's Hungry Bay, for example). The economic cost of climate change (for tourism, agriculture, health, public infrastructure) was estimated to be between 1.5 and 5% of GDP (Samaniego et al. 2014) . Understandably the position of AOSIS and the Caribbean in recent international climate negotiations in preparation for the sustainable development goals (SDGs) and at the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) COP 21 centred around resource mobilisation to improve climate finance and technical support for climate change adaptation efforts especially in the areas of national adaptation planning, amelioration of loss and damage, disaster risk management and public health. These regional priorities fall within the global sustainable development goals and targets: SDG 3-Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages and SDG 13-Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
In Caribbean climate change governance, who are the actors that are to be accountable, and to whom? Climate change is managed at regional and national levels, and regional intergovernmental organisations have programmes to support national climate change governance. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is the region's highest intergovernmental political decision-making body that shapes regional agendas through the Heads of Government meetings. Member states include: Antigua and Barbuda, Jamaica, The Bahamas, Montserrat, Barbados, Saint Lucia, Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, Suriname, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Haiti. CARICOM coordinated three adaptation planning and mainstreaming of climate change in developmental projects between 1997 and 2007 (Caricom 2014) after which the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) was created to coordinate regional adaptation and mitigation efforts. Each of CARICOM's 15 states manages its national climate change agenda, and the CCCCC is engaged as a vehicle to attract funding for adaptation and mitigation projects. The work of the CCCCC is often at the margin of national and community adaptation strategies unless funding or assistance is obtained through the CCCCC. Many institutions form part of the regional climate governance architecture: the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) (a sub-regional political grouping), 1 the Association of Caribbean states (all states around the Caribbean Sea including parts of Central and South America) and a network of issue-specific state and non-state agencies whose mandate connects with climate change in areas such as coastal health, financial planning, and health and water management.
2 Regional non-governmental organisations in the larger Caribbean islands work alongside state agencies and community groups to promote education, conduct vulnerability assessments, help build capacity for policy making and ecosystem-based solutions especially in areas such as fishing, tourism, water supply and management, wildlife and species conservation and forest management. National climate change actors include state departments or agencies, the private sector (tourism, construction, agriculture, for example), and environmental non-governmental organisations and community groups. Most climate change state departments are small (with 2-15 persons) and under resourced (Field et al. 2014 ).
Governance effectiveness is low for many Caribbean states, and weak governance limits the timely and effective implementation of climate adaptation and mitigation policies (Scobie 2016) . According to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, in the period 2002-2012 for example, most Caribbean SIDS register negative (below zero) or very low levels (0.5-1) of governance effectiveness when compared, for example, with the USA, the closest developed nation and main trading partner for most of the islands. The Bank's governance indicator which ranges from -2.5 to 2 is inter alia designed to capture perceptions of the quality of public services and of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. As this study on accountability reveals, there are good reasons for these rankings and improving accountability can contribute to improved perceptions on the quality of policy formulation and implementation in climate governance in particular.
Accountability framework
In the sections that follow, after introducing the framework of accountability levels (internal and external), types (normative, relational, decision and behavioural) and mechanisms (certification, monitoring, participation by stakeholders and self-reporting) (Fig. 1) , the paper outlines the methodology and presents the findings of the research on how far accountability is embedded in Caribbean climate change governance. 
LEVELS OF ACCOUNTABILTY

Governance and accountability
Environmental governance is regulated through international, regional and national laws but also through institutional frameworks, and norms and values (March and Olsen 1989; Biermann et al. 2009; Andonova and Mitchell 2010) that create a network of principles and mechanisms or best practices to guide the governance endeavour (Kuzdas and Wiek 2014; Balboa 2016; Gordon 2016; Gulbrandsen and Auld 2016; Hoffmann 2016; Kramarz and Park 2016; Kuyper and Backstrand 2016; Moore and Squires 2016; Nelson 2016) . Environmental governance requires handling economic and environmental risks and stresses; transforming economic development while ensuring a diversity of options across natural, social and economic systems (Nilsson and Persson 2012) . The importance of accountability as a key principle, norm or value of environmental governance is uncontested, underpins every task of governance and enters into every stage of environmental governance, from agenda setting, implementation of mandates, cooperation and creating cooperative relationships, regulation and enforcement, monitoring, capacity building and information sharing (Keohane and Nye 2000) . Accountability mechanisms should ensure that actors across scales and sectors are held to account but is fragmented among actors (from global to local), issue areas (spatial, species, source) and scales of action: each actor should account to others within its organisation or group as well as to external stakeholders related to the issue area.
Although an excessive focus on institutional mechanisms and design for governance and accountability in well-trodden areas of environmental governance may detract from efforts to find solutions to specific environmental problems (Kramarz and Park 2016) , recent literature emphasised the importance of gaining a better understanding of the nexus between institutional accountability frameworks and good environmental outcomes and recent studies are beginning to fill this gap: for example, cities governance (Gordon 2016) ; private investment (Balboa 2016) ; certification organisations [for example, the Marine Stewardship Council (Gulbrandsen and Auld 2016)] and observer organisations [for example, within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Kuyper and Backstrand 2016) ]. There are many sectors, however, where the institutional design does not yet include structured accountability frameworks, and these are underexplored in the literature: for instance in emerging issue areas of deep sea resource governance (Moore and Squires 2016) and climate governance in many parts of the developing world. How can accountability be conceptualised where-as is the case in many developing states-structured institutional designs and frameworks are lacking and where resource limitations make immediate creation and implementation of such structures unlikely? What proxies may be used to determine the quality of accountability in environmental governance? This paper answers these questions for climate change governance in relation to Caribbean SIDS.
Levels, relationships and mechanisms
Who should be accountable to whom? Keohane introduced the concept of categories or levels of accountability and distinguished internal from external accountability (Keohane 2003) . Within a group or an organisation, internal accountability is exercised through formal principal-agent relationships; by oversight from internal stakeholders, self-reporting by those responsible to others within the organisation and feedback from the latter on the information supplied (internal stakeholder participation and self-reporting). Thus, for example, within a government department, technical officers should be accountable to their political superiors and to those from related departments. These officials should provide regular reports on the department's activities, their superiors and those from related departments with a stake in the activities have a right and duty to determine the extent to which the officials or department concerned acted in conformity with policy, mandates, internal regulations, targets, etc. Where strict accountability is observed, the determination of these internal stakeholders may affect the future actions, budgets and progress of the officials or department providing the report. Without these mechanisms, there is no way to ensure the efficient use of public resources. External accountability refers to the relationships between those acting and those outside the formal organisational structure. Continuing with the previous example, where NGOs or the private sector may be affected by the actions of a department of government, the department should be accountable to these external stakeholders. The same is true for any private entity that has an environmental impact on those external to the organisation.
How can stakeholders demand accountability? Environmental governance literature centres around four main accountability mechanisms or tools: certification, stakeholder participation, performance monitoring and self-reporting. Certification, in most cases, is a voluntary process where an actor submits his operations to the examination of impartial third parties to investigate and determine to what extent the actor complies with the guidelines or principles to be certified. In developing states, certification is less used often because limited resources and the financial cost and technical standards required by third party private certification agencies make uptake problematic [as confirmed by recent studies in fisheries (Stratoudakis et al. 2016 ) and tourism (Duffy and Moore 2011; Buckley 2012) ]. Stakeholder participation, performance monitoring and self-reporting should be direct means by which stakeholders can regularly assess and determine the quality of the actions of those internal to organisations with which they have an interest or stake. In developed good governance frameworks, the organisation itself has institutional mechanisms to facilitate these accountability processes. In many developing states these processes are still ad hoc with no resources assigned for their execution. To answer the question of who is accountable to whom, the final element of the framework examines accountability relationships-these determine which actors have duty to report to or a right to assess the performance of others (Fig. 2) . There are four types of accountability relationships discussed in environmental governance literature (Grant and Keohane 2005; Biermann and Gupta 2011; Keohane and Victor 2011) . Normative accountability is the relationship created between one actor and others when one actor has the right to expect compliance with established norms/standards of the other-it is these norms or rules that create the relationship, as for example, when urban developers are obliged by law to certify that their plans use building codes for hurricane resistant dwellings. The law creates normative accountability relationships between the developer, the relevant government agency, the certifier, the buyer of the dwelling and NGOs that monitor disaster risk management. The accounting actor may fulfil his duty through self-reporting and the actor that has the right to demand accountability may engage in performance monitoring. Normative accountability is also the basis by which regional and national agencies are expected to report, as part of project implementation, on compliance with the rules given by an external climate change financing organisation. Relational accountability is the nexus established between one actor and others when legal or institutional arrangements establish accountability rights and duties, for example, to provide regular reports, to obtain third party certification, to allow performance monitoring and stakeholder participation. In many developing states, relational accountability is underdeveloped because these rights and duties are not built into policy, budgets nor work streams. Decision accountability is the aspect of accountability that locates where and how the assessment of an actor's behaviour is made by third parties that have a right to pronounce on the former's actions-through, for example, certification or at the time of self-reporting. Decision accountability thus refers to the power of some actors to judge the actions of others. Behavioural accountability gives power to those who hold actors accountable to impose penalties or sanctions for failure to keep to pre-established standards of behaviour (for example, through withholding or revoking third party certification or naming and shaming of actors by NGO watchdogs). This Accountability Framework thus distinguishes types of actors (those internal and those external to organisations or agencies), the types of accountability relationships between the actors and what creates them as well as the types of mechanisms available to actors to give account or to require accountability. This is helpful to later understand accountability in the Caribbean SIDS case study.
Methodology
The study was undertaken during period December 2013 to June 2015. The data collected represents the views of major actors and representative NGOs and private sector groups. It is the first attempt to map accountability from a climate change perspective for Caribbean SIDS.
The first stage of the study mapped the actors that formed part of the regional climate change governance architecture between 1997 and 2014. The region does not have a comprehensive database on regional and local climate change initiatives. Data were obtained from the official websites, reports, project documents and surveys. Care was taken to include actors that had climate change as part of their mandate and that were involved in the governance or management of projects with climate change adaptation or mitigation impacts. The information was collected and collated according to scale/level of actor action (regional to local); type of actor (state/private sector/non-state); functions and type of activities carried out (climate specific of tangentially climate related); geographic area of action (regional projects/local projects). The main actors were interstate agencies, national agencies, the private sector and NGOs. At the government level, these agencies included, for example, (CARDI) . Few environmental NGOS operate at the regional level and have readily available information on their climate governance accountability processes or on how they contribute to the accountability of other actors through their monitoring and surveillance. The most prominent NGOs used in the study were Environment Tobago, the Caribbean Youth Environment Network and CANARI from Trinidad and Tobago, the St. Lucia National Trust from St. Lucia, the Fondation pour la Protection de la Biodiversité Marine from Haiti and the Environment Foundation of Jamaica. Several private sector actors are part of the climate change governance nexus in the region. The business sector in most islands has a person assigned to climate change-related issues in the respective chambers of industry, commerce and agriculture. The islands that depended most upon tourism also had a climate change focal point in the tourism industry associations. These persons were the ones called upon by government agencies when stakeholder participation was required, for example, for climate change projects but they shared their climate change portfolio with several others and in most cases were not climate change specialists. This official and relatively accessible data were enhanced with a survey and follow-up semistructured interviews.
The purpose of the interviews was to explain, contextualise where necessary and validate the survey results. Fifty requests were sent asking agencies and organisations to participate in the survey, and twenty responses were obtained. The respondents were asked about the limited responses in the semi-structured interviews. Very few persons are willing to go on record, few persons considered themselves knowledgeable or experienced on climate governance in the region because those engaged in climate change generally did not spend more than 2 or 3 years in one portfolio, most agencies did not have established governance and accountability processes, and officials were unwilling to speak and give personal views where no official documentation was available. Twenty of the 22 respondents to the survey agreed to be interviewed. These were the persons both designated by the respective government department, regional agency, private sector agency or NGO as the climate change expert and of course willing to accede to the interview which in almost all cases included a pre-condition of anonymity. Participants were in all cases directors of agencies or organisations or senior division heads or were the climate change subjectmatter expert in the organisation. The Caribbean region is small and the subject-matter experts on climate change meet and share efforts at multiple regional and national forums. They share a good understanding of the governance realities of each agency. There was a very high degree of coherence in the views of the regional, national, private sector and NGO experts interviewed. Though the sample size was relatively small, the level of seniority of respondents within their organisations and the mix of public, private, NGO and technical agency subject-matter experts provided an objective and authoritative picture of the reality of accountability across the region. This process ensured that the views of experts from across the region were obtained and cemented the validity and reliability of the findings from the survey results. Most of the respondents worked at international, regional and national scales. Seventeen worked specifically in climate change and development projects but all of them included climate change governance as part of other development initiatives (for example, tourism, agriculture and biodiversity). In terms of impact or scope of the agencies from which the respondents came, each agency directly worked with or engaged between 50 and 6000 persons on an annual basis. Many respondents counted the entire population of their country-and the regional agencies the entire regional population-as the direct beneficiaries of their programmes-the figures ranged from 220 million for the regional agencies' responses to ''several hundred'' or ''thousands'' for the NGOs. Reported operational annual budgets ranged from an average of 115,000 US$ for some private sector agencies to 3 million for the national agencies.
The survey was used to map the extent to which the four accountability mechanisms were available and used at regional to local scales. It was administered online to the 22 respondents. The survey asked actors to state whether these accountability mechanisms were in their mandate and or a regular part of their activities: promoting certification; the participation of stakeholders in overseeing sector projects; monitoring the sector and the performance of actors in the sector and (at least) annual self-reporting. Respondents were asked to report on whether each of the mechanisms were either (a) in their mandate and often part of their activities; (b) in their mandate but seldom part of their activities; (c) not in their mandate but often part of their activities or (d) not in their mandate and seldom part of their activities. Using Excel, responses were collated and the data analysed according to type of actor (government, international, regional, national, NGO, private sector, academia). Percentages were obtained for two values: which groups of actors used which mechanisms (certification, self-reporting, etc.) and the frequency with each group of actors used each mechanism (in the actor's mandate and or part of their activities, etc.) and are reported in the findings section below. The semi-structured interviews-between 30 min and 1 h-were conducted with survey participants that indicated a willingness to participate in a follow-on interview. The interviews gave respondents an opportunity to explain survey responses and helped to ensure the validity of the information obtained from the surveys. The interviews gave respondents an opportunity to share further details on two specific points-first, their organisation's internal and external accountability processes and second how accountability is managed within the sector (by other actors at regional and local scales).
Accountability in Caribbean climate change governance
Using the accountability framework discussed above, the survey and interviews provided data on: the levels at which accountability is exercised (internal and external); on the types of accountability relationships (normative, relational, decision and behaviour) and on the accountability mechanisms most used (certification, involvement of stakeholders in overseeing and monitoring of projects, monitoring performance of actors within the sector and self-reporting). This section reports on the findings.
Caribbean climate change governance: levels of accountability
Internal accountability was measured by the existence of mechanisms for (a) stakeholder participation and (b) self-reporting within the organisation. External accountability was measured by the existence of the four mechanisms: (a) certification, (b) stakeholder participation, (c) performance monitoring and (d) self-reporting. Using this framework, the study found that the region's actors that are part of climate governance architectures are weaker on external accountability and need external assistance to strengthen governance. The small scale and resources available to these agencies make many of these accountability mechanisms difficult to employ. Regional organisations, national agencies, the private sector and NGOS in the region were on aggregate marginally more accountable within their organisations and to their principals (average of 77%) than to external stakeholders and third parties (average of 65%). However, the interviews revealed that when agencies applied accountability mechanisms, they did so selectively. International and regional organisations were stronger on internal accountability. They engaged in selfreporting, for example, via annual or periodic reports as part of their mandate to report to member states on progress in implementing decisions and in the use of member contributions. State agencies did not systematically budget time and resources into their work streams for any form of internal accountability. There were cases of reporting by public officials to their principals or line ministers on adaptation policy, planning and implementation but this was ad hoc and the few cases of regular reporting were driven by the personal initiative of a department head. Government officials explained that in many cases there was a practice of hoarding of information within state departments. It was not uncommon that colleagues from the same or closely related departments would not share information or brief them on their activities or meetings with international, regional or local agencies. Much less was there a duty to involve other internal stakeholders in performance monitoring. The study found that NGOs had most difficulty with internal accountability. Most NGOs were small, with limited budgets. Their boards of directors often lacked the capacity, organisation or time to provide needed oversight. NGOs tended to engage in self-reporting only when involved in projects requiring foreign funders. The incidence of external accountability was marginally less than internal accountability. Respondents unanimously felt that actors were not accountable to external stakeholders-a governance problem not limited to climate change. According to the survey, 40% of the organisations promoted certification and about 60% were engaged in monitoring. Respondents explained that in reality, though they promoted certification programmes, few were certified and monitoring and stakeholder engagement activities were irregular and not systematic.
Caribbean climate change governance: accountability relationships (normative, relational, decision and behaviour)
This section uses the classification of the four types of accountability relationships to test how these relationships are operationalised in the Caribbean case.
Normative accountability
Normative accountability implies clear standards and a duty of actors to conform behaviour to those standards. This form of accountability represented 65% of accountability efforts according to survey responses. This means that a majority of climate change actors reported to have some level of accountability standards and were engaged in some form certification, stakeholder participation, performance monitoring and self-reporting to achieve them. The use of these mechanisms, however, was limited. Normative accountability was stronger where agencies outside of the region (donor or headquarter offices of international organisations or transnational companies) stipulated pre-established standards of behaviour in the loan or grant project documents-such as meetings with community groups or their involvement in adaptation infrastructure projects. Most national agencies did not have behavioural standards or reporting matrices for internal or external accountability. The environmental NGOs were critical of the low quality of normative accountability of state agencies that consisted mainly of irregular internal self-reporting and sporadic stakeholder forums.
Relational accountability
Relational accountability is the nexus created between actors that have a right to hold others to recognised standards of behaviour (through certification, stakeholder participation, performance monitoring and self-reporting). It goes a step further than normative accountability to establish a relationship of entitlement between actors. Government climate change agencies stated that they had these relationships with stakeholders (such as the private sector and community groups) but that the tools they used to give account were used to a limited degree. Relational accountability was strongest when projects involved external/foreign funding agencies because they came with accountability conditionalities such as regular meetings with stakeholders and incorporating their feedback into project development. Outside of those cases, most respondents stated that there was little evidence of relational accountability either within agencies or between agencies and outside stakeholders. Most international agencies attributed their accountability practices to standards from headquarter organisations. Most regional organisations did not have similar instruments. The Association of Caribbean States, for example, focused on promoting political cooperation between regional governments and partnering with national agencies to support national activities and depended on the lead from member states for accountability mechanisms. Environmental NGO respondents were least convinced that climate change actors exercised relational accountability. They reported that national climate change governance was ''top down'', ''lacking transparency'' with ''superficial consultations''. Officials from regional and national agencies climate change believed that they should be accountable only to their political bosses. They did not see themselves as having a duty to report to or to have accounting relationships with other departments and external stakeholders such as the general public, the private sector or environmental NGOs. Information sharing via public consultations or posting information on climate policy and department performance on websites was in most cases seen as part of outreach and not of accountability.
A noteworthy exception to this general trend was Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Commission (which serviced the political grouping of the smaller Eastern Caribbean islands) that institutionalised mechanisms for accountability through public participation and certification. In these microstates, stakeholders have more recently been part of some government committees for climate policy, and contributed human resources and expertise to climate adaptation efforts. The government of Grenada also made noteworthy efforts to engage civil society during the Sustainable Development National Planning Processes; however, without external funding, it was unlikely to have resources to sustain that relationship into monitoring, evaluating and implementation stages of the national sustainable development plan.
Decision accountability
Decision accountability exists when actors have a right to judge whether others kept to established standards of behaviour through, for example, third party certification and via self-reporting. The study found that it was, after behavioural accountability, second weakest area of accountability in the Caribbean. Most agencies did not have reporting protocols nor standards of behaviour for climate governance. As a consequence, the processes to assess behaviour were not available in most cases. Although 77% of the respondents engaged in some form of internal self-reporting, the reporting process did not give external stakeholders an avenue to assess behaviour because in the absence of protocols, there was no incentive to report on less positive aspects of performance. Local actors have not had the expertise and resources to obtain and maintain certification in climate-related endeavours. Most hotels, for example, recognised the value of climate certification (for energy saving) but reported that the cost of obtaining and maintaining third party certification was prohibitive for the small scale of their establishments. Developing Caribbean-appropriate certification in climate change for both public and private actors may facilitate decision accountability.
Behavioural accountability
Behavioural accountability exists when some actors have the right to impose sanctions for failures to keep to pre-established standards (e.g. a hotel may be refused certification relating to climate ready building plans or a third party certifier may decline to renew an energy saving related certificate or label if the hotel fails to keep to pre-established standards). There was little evidence of this type of accountability in the region. There was behavioural accountability in the case of projects with external donor financing, as donors could sanction by limiting future funding. However, donors were generally reluctant to sanction government agencies and to prescribe monitoring and evaluation by local stakeholders for it could be seen as interfering with national policy. At the national level government agents were not sanctioned for non-reporting, not monitoring the performance of actors in the sector nor for failures to engage stakeholders in accountability processes since resources were usually not assigned for these processes and these were not part of their mandate. At the level of NGOs, their strongest internal sanction should come from their own board of directors but these organisations are small with boards that work on a voluntary or almost voluntary basis and most lack time and capacity to critically examine or sanction behaviour.
In sum, accountability relationships among climate governance actors need to be strengthened. Work is needed to improve governance through guidelines and standards (normative accountability); to establish reporting protocols for external and internal reporting (relational accountability); to create systems for stakeholders to assess performance (decision accountability) and to sanction (behaviour accountability). Having examined internal and external accountability and the different types of accountability relationships, the next section of the paper reports on the ways in which the four mechanisms outlined above (a) certification, (b) stakeholder participation, (c) performance monitoring and (d) self-reporting were used by climate governance actors in the region.
Caribbean climate change governance: accountability mechanisms
Survey respondents were asked to comment on whether the mechanisms were in their mandate and the extent of their use. The figure below summarises the findings which are explained in this part (Fig. 3) .
Forty-one per cent of the respondents promoted certification. International organisations were responsible for about 34% of the effort, national agencies and the private sector each accounted for about 22% of the efforts to promote certification in the region. In the interviews respondents clarified that in many cases, those efforts were to educate themselves and stakeholders on best practices assessed by certification agencies rather than to foster the acquisition of climate change-related certification by local stakeholders. Generally, they encouraged local communities and businesses to adopt the practices employed to obtain certification, adapting where possible. The Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), for example, conducted seminars to promote Climate-Smart Agriculture practices but most local farmers were not certified as certification was too costly and complicated. The Caribbean Tourism Organisation encouraged hotels to use smart technology to reduce energy and water consumption in hotels and neighbouring communities but few hotels were certified by Green Globe, Blue Flag or any other third party eco-certification programme. The governments and private sector also regularly informed special groups such as tourism operators and farmers about what was required for certification that could help them into save energy or improve water management and land use but more technical assistance and financial support would be needed for the small establishments to get certified. Technical agencies such as the meteorological agencies used certification to ensure the accuracy of instruments; transnational companies applied the certification programmes used in their head offices, and some of the larger regional and international companies were certified by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Environmental Management System Standard (ISO 14001). Eighty per cent of agencies reported that they promoted participation of stakeholders in overseeing climate sector projects. Regional agencies were more active than national and international agencies. But interviews revealed that this participation was generally not helpful for accountability. Public sector managed consultations were not systematically employed for policy design and implementation, and there were no regular forums to facilitate public participation. When some form of interdepartmental committee did exist, related departments (such as finance, planning and attorney general) were unable or unavailable to regularly attend. Environmental NGOs and government officials agreed that quality of public consultations was poor: insufficient notice was given and stakeholders were often unprepared to review and discuss the documents; eighty or more per cent of the time was used to explain the project or policy with little available time for feedback. There was little or no reporting on how feedback from stakeholders was used. Thirty to fifty per cent of (the larger) NGOS participated in national committees often with their own resources. The private sector was less engaged, with about ten to thirty per cent involvement.
About 63% of the climate change actors reported that they regularly monitored the performance of other actors in the sector. Regional agencies engaged in monitoring even when this function was not in their core mandate. Less than a third of the national agencies had monitoring as part of their mandate and about one-third regularly engaged in monitoring. Technocrats in climate change departments (often pushed by political bosses to deliver projects within the election term) did not have the time to engage in public consultation nor to facilitate public involvement in project design and implementation. Environmental NGO had monitoring as an integral part of their activity. The private sector was less engaged in monitoring the performance of other actors unless a particular state or NGO led initiative negatively affected the financial operations of one of their members. The low levels of engagement and participation in consultations and projects and in monitoring the performance of other actors were caused by limited interest of actors in the projects of others and limited resources (time, personnel, capacity, data to analyse performance). Monitoring and participation may be improved if context relevant benchmarks, reporting frameworks and structured consultation systems were developed and included in mandates and work streams of the relevant actors.
Self-reporting provides stakeholders with information to assess the performance of the agency or actor giving the report. About 80% of respondents used regular self-reporting for internal accountability. There was little external pressure for the private sector to engage in climate-related self-reporting. Most public sector officials saw reporting to their ministers and to cabinet as the main way to exercise (internal) accountability. A few climate-related departments reported monthly or regularly, and those were driven by the personal initiative of department heads. The reports were often a statement of activities rather than an analysis of performance against pre-established indicators. There were usually no sanction mechanisms available to internal or external stakeholders (as would be the case if reporting was for certification purposes, for example). Perhaps for this reason, some environmental NGO respondents complained that regional government reports and national communications (to multilateral environmental agreements or through the UNFCC processes, for example) were inadequate forms of external accountability and ''fluff'', reflecting ''aspirational goals'' rather than the substance of what the governments did during the period under review. Some government departments attempted to report through their websites, most acknowledge that they did not have resources to keep this service regularly updated.
Discussion
What accounts for the negative prognosis in the levels of accountability and the limited accountability relationships and mechanisms of accountability in climate change governance? What can we learn from these findings and what do these findings mean for governance policy in the region? Imbedded in climate change governance is context: the Caribbean region is one with limited resources (financial and human) for governance and limited resources reduce stakeholders' ability to demand and deliver accountability (Scharpf 1997) .
First and importantly, the key climate change governance actors are cognisant of and value accountability for good governance and should give little resistance to building accountability processes into existing work streams. However, those actors that had accountability tools as part of their activities and mandates acknowledged that it was difficult to regularly employ them. More climate finance and technical assistance is needed specifically to develop governance processes and structures since it is unlikely that the resources will come from regular government budgets. In this respect, the study supports and adds to existing literature in two ways: it highlights the challenges that resource scarcities bring to governance efforts as well as the openness of Caribbean actors towards the adoption of improved governance systems (Barnett 2010; Baldwin et al. 2013 ). The findings go farther however: the interviewed climate change experts mentioned other factors that in their view limited accountability. Government officials said that stakeholder consultations were often politicised and used by parliamentary oppositions to force delays in project implementation with ''useless'' demands for further preliminary studies or reports. Some ministers, senior officials and technocrats avoided the involvement of stakeholders external to their departments (whether other departments, political bosses or the public) if they foresaw competing political, technical or financial agendas that could cause interference, objections or delay the progress of a project or implementation of a policy. Civil society was insufficiently mobilised and funded to monitor and demand accountability. Both environmental NGOs and the private sector relied on the government to initiate climate governance accountability processes. The general public were disengaged and showed little interest in climate adaptation and mitigation initiatives that were not directly related to redress after an extreme event like a flood or hurricane. Good climate governance is essential for SIDS' survival but in the Caribbean more resources are put into the technical aspects of adaptation and mitigation and little emphasis is placed on the governance systems needed to ensure effective delivery of climate goals. This is a serious omission that needs to be addressed in regional and national climate policy and in climate finance and technical assistance. The solution transcends climate governance and requires changes in societal and governance structures towards a greater prioritisation of resources towards accountability mechanisms and relationships at both internal and external levels.
Conclusion
The value of this study was twofold: first it developed a framework to test accountability for climate governance actors, and second it provided an in-depth analysis based on perspectives from experts on the nature of climate change governance in Caribbean SIDS. Agency, territoriality, architectures and scale are helpful to analyse regional governance (Balsiger and Van Deveer 2012) . For the region, the main actors were: regional organisations that member states mandate to promote climate change-related technical cooperation projects on their behalf; national government departments and agencies; environmental NGOs and the private sector. The analysis of levels of accountability, types of accountability relationships and mechanisms for accountability that formed part of the framework was helpful to understand how these regional actors managed accountability in governance. Internal accountability or accountability within departments was stronger than external accountability generally because actors did not recognise external stakeholders as agents to whom they should be directly accountable. Normative accountability was weak as in most cases there were no established standards of governance to guide actions or processes and no form of sanction for poor governance. As with many other situations of limited resources and pressing development and adaptation needs, fewer resources are used for governance processes and it is harder to get support for governance investments that do not have tangible short term benefits to the society (Debarbieux 2008; Underdal 2010) . Climate actors in the Caribbean were aware of the importance of accountability for climate governance but needed more resources to incorporate accountability practices into governance. Climate finance should provide greater support to building accountability mechanisms and processes into existing accountability relationships. At all levels, Caribbean SIDS need systems to operationalise accountability relationships-both internal and external, for example, developing climate certification programmes suited to local contexts and resources. Frameworks and mechanisms for reporting and monitoring should be developed that take account of the governance challenges faced in the region: the small size and limited resources of climate-related regional, national, NGO and private sector departments; higher levels of political interference in decision-making within government departments and the difficulties in obtaining data and keeping the general public engaged in monitoring governance processes and actors. This paper provided data to contribute to the understanding of the nature of climate change governance in SIDS by focusing on accountability mechanisms and relationships in Caribbean SIDS. Resources for sustained participatory governance are needed as actors expand beyond the state to the networks of actors now present in the region; however, small size comes with a permanent resource limitation to manage fragmented and participatory governance. The study and the framework employed open the way for further research into climate change governance and accountability at local and regional scales in other developing states.
